Thursday, February 28, 2013

Views of Conflict in a Bordering Nation, the case of Senegal

Hi! First post in a long time, lots going on in village. Since my last post, I went to America, came back, and am now just about to begin construction on 30 pit latrines throughout my village. Today, though, I wanted to post about something else: the ongoing conflict in Mali. First, however, I need to emphasise: I am not identifying with any political affairs of issues of this or any other country. I am not trying to make a political statement in regards to any actions of the Senegalese or any other governments. I am simply trying to provide some local information in order to better contextualise and frame the ongoing conflict in Mali, and by extension, much of West Africa.  As many of you know, the Malian government is currently being assisted by various countries to combat an insurgency in the northern half of the country, an area approximately the size of France.
 After a massive infusion of guns into Libya in 2011, the Tuareg ethnic minority in northern Mali gained an edge in their ongoing (since 2004) struggle for independence. This led to a  coup in Mali, as mutinying soldiers overthrew  the elected government of Mali, claiming that it was not taking the rebellion in the north seriously enough. Captain Amadou Sonogo, a leader in the coup, had formerly" participated in several U.S.-funded International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in the United States, including basic officer training,”  according to the U.S. military's Africa Command. The new Malian government promised to "wage a total and relentless war" on the separatists. Since then, various foreign powers have vied for control in the region, including foreign jihadists, Tuareg groups, and armies of several nations.  As someone interested in conflict and reasonably close to the region, I was very interested in how much of an effect I would see, “on the ground,” of the invasions and interventions next door. Violence in Senegal is very unlikely, as the fighting is in remote and distant areas of northern Mali, and Senegal is used to conflict in nearby zones: every country which borders Senegal, besides The Gambia, has experienced atleast one coup in the past few years.

Although most of the refugees fleeing Mali have been going to Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina-Faso, the conflict is visible in Senegal on the ground, even in the relatively remote area of Kedougou. As an official Mali/Senegal border crossing, the region of Kedougou sees quite a bit of traffic going between the two countries, including a large amount of trucks, going through at all hours of the day. The border crossings have been very busy, though the traffic may be a different sort than normal.  Increasingly, they are empty 18-wheelers, leaving Mali in giant convoys, heading north to the Dakar region. One night coming back into Kedougou from Tambacounda, well over 200 trucks, all empty, passed us. Other people have left as well: in the weeks after the coup, NGO trucks-- white Toyota Land Cruisers, left in droves. As the fighting came closer to Bamako, the capital, many international organizations closed shop and left the country. Later on Senegalese trucks marked “Surveillance and Intervention,” passed through the area, onwards into Mali.

The Senegalese army sent 500 troops to fight in Mali, and soldiers have been dispatched to this region, to protect the border, and more recently, to reduce illegal immigration, especially to the gold mines in the north east of the region. At the county seat of Saria, in the east of the Kedougou region, the soldiers assembled for calisthenics on the basketball field, before heading off to Bomako .The army thus has a much more visible presence-- trucks of soldiers in Kedouogou is now a common sight.

The conflict has affected people whose livelihood depends on border crossing. Although I haven't seen the changes on the Senegalese/Mali border, a Senegal/Guinea border post is very close to my village. The security there seems to be increased, as a “suspicious character” was arrested at the border, and detained. He didn't speak any local languages, and apparently had ties to Pakistan. It turned out he was an visiting student from England, and he was released after detention and questioning. Even the AP wrote about it. Other suspects have been arrested in other areas of the country. A heightened border security certainly reduces some people's ability to earn a living, as many people in rural villages travel to various weekly markets, selling vegetables, consumer products, and the like. Many run a circuit, back and forth across the border, to reach as many markets as possible. Border enforcements certainly makes that more difficult, I have seen. Even for volunteers, internal security has been more apparent, as apparent foreigners are being paid more attention. At a routine security check on the national highway, the police officer looked around in the mini-bus a volunteer was in, pointed at the North African herders that were sitting in a group together and said, "I don't know you guys," and asked for identification cards.

The ongoing conflict is a major topic of conversation in village as well. Hillary Clinton's visit to Dakar and Algeria (to encourage participation in the Malian conflict) was discussed, but most people in my village were against getting involved. A friend of mine told me a Pulaar proverb, when arguing why Senegal should not send troops: “War does not eat leaves and grass.” At the same time, the perception that most of the combatants in Mali are of north-African “Arab” descent has led to more discrimination against “Nareebe,” a West African ethnic slur for Arabs, deriving from the Arabic word for fire and memories of conflict and raids. The Mauritanian population in the Kedougou area seems to be under increasing scrutiny, and checkpoints have increased in number around the country. A man in my village who often goes to go work in a fish factory in Mauritania said he will not going this year, as “Arabs can't be trusted.” The Lebanese population already received some criticism, and the threat of “terrorists” fleeing Mali to come to Senegal, has lead to increasing distrust of people of North African and Arab descent, atleast in my area.  Now that Senegal has sent some troops and the conflict has received regional and world attention, most people I talk to seem to support the intervention, but want it to be over quickly. I have heard some fears that the conflict will drag on, with France getting bogged down in the desert. "Up there, there's nothing but sand, it's easy to hide," one border-hopping travelling salesman told me.

In Dakar, the invasion is readily apparent as well. Recently, a volunteer took this video of French armed forces coming in through Dakar, apparently headed south. He claims to have seen over 200 cars pass, all apparently of French national origin. Here's the video:
 


 The president of Senegal, Macky Sall, has been vocal in his support for the French and West African (ECOWAS) intervention, and has many several speeches on the subject, outlining “the terrorist offence” as a “direct menace” to the “the Senegalese State.” He clarified that the Senegalese intervention in Mali was not only a “mission to maintain the peace,” but a “just war, a war of good against evil,” to “protect national sanctity.” It is a war to “defend the homeland,” he went on to say. Others, such as General Pathe Seck, Senegal’s Interior Minister, told the Senegalese people the need for them to be vigilant and act as shields against the spread of terrorism.

 Some reactions of the government seem very similar to the United States in the “War on Terror,”  with an emphasis on a particular ethnic group, and increasing security. The worries about border crossing by possible violent elements and 'illegal aliens' is also similar to American reactions against immigrants in the aftermath of September 2011, as fears of foreigners rose. The choice of  military rather than diplomatic solution is also similar, given some American military support for the Malian government, and the current American effort to institute AFRICOM, a  security-cooperation agreement throughout much of Africa, with plans on building military bases and  serving as a counterweight to supposed radical Muslium elements in Africa.  Senegal, along with many of its neighbours,  is an active partner with the United States in Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative in the “War on Terror,” supporting counterterrorism measures against alleged threats of Al Qaeda in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, and Morocco.

The huge amount of trucks leaving, as well as NGO's moving out of the country show a definite capital flight. Foreign investors, international aid, and so on, are moving out of the conflict zone, as foreign military forces pour in. NGO's tend to avoid conflict zones, sometimes leading to situations where international organisations don't operate in the the poorest nations, due to ongoing (often times, low-intensity) conflicts.

France's heavy involvement in the conflict is unsurprising: as a former colony and a member of ECOWAS and a nation which uses the CFA, a former colonial currency, France and Mali share many economic, social, and military ties. The still-large population of French people both in Mali and the generation of colonial officers who served in the French Africa keep many connections, so France seeks to guarantee stability in former colonial areas. This diplomatic phenomenon is known as Franceafrique, and is evident in France's post-colonial military actions in many parts of Africa, most recently Cote D'Ivoire.

Two weeks ago, the fist suicide bomber rocked Mali; even after presidential speeches by Hollande promising victory soon, rebellious paratroopers were shot by government troops. Since, more suicide bombers have attacked, including a car bomb yesterday. It's unclear how the conflict will continue as the ongoing situation in Mali has shown itself to have an effect larger than just in the northern area of Mali. Senegal seems dedicated: with the investment of troops, Senegal is taking a leadership role. Across the region, however, the conflict has emerged as a political force: in Algeria, the takeover of the state-owned gas plant was carried out in response to the Algerian government allowing France to use national airspace. With France's promise to put Mali back together-- "not one space of Mali's territory be under the control of terrorists--",it is unclear how long international attention will stay on Mali. With the support of the United Sates, among various other western and regional powers, the capacity for a larger conflict is there; already French tourists have been taken hostage in Cameroon, serving as a warning that even other nations may react. With the opening of a U.S. drone base to serve as a regional hub in Niger, and Obama's pledge that the 100 troops stationed there would aid France in the war in Mali, the United States may find itself more and more involved. Just days ago, a bomb threat was reported against the American embassy in Senegal. All Americans here heard about it in text message from the Embassy. As a judge recently commented in France, foreign intervention in conflicts like these can increase domestic threats, as 'collateral damage' (human rights violations have been reported by all parties involved in the conflict) will  make “the threat... higher and higher...Because they will be trained and come back and organize themselves.” He went on to add: “This is the way terrorists win — they can win with very little.” It's still too soon to tell if the foreign intervention into Mali will increase or decrease future political violence in the region, as French steps up its involvement, militants are leaving Mali for elsewhere.